Concluding Remarks by Kozo Kunimune
Concluding Remarks
権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア
経済研究所 / Institute of Developing
Economies, Japan External Trade Organization
(IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp
シリーズタイトル(英
)
Occasional Papers Series
シリーズ番号 39
journal or
publication title
Overcoming Asia's Currency and Financial
Crises: A Theoretical Investigation
page range 121-126
year 2004
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/00010633
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 1 began with an overview of the policy issues ranging from manage-
ment of the macroeconomy to banking policy and which included a review of
the debate over the relationship between economic development and develop-
ment of the financial sector. From this broad perspective, the chapter sought to
place the arguments presented in this volume within the wider debate about
the Asian currency and financial crises. The chapter also argued that any
debate over financial and economic policies has to be undertaken from an
overall perspective that is fully cognizant of the mutual relationships that exist
among policies.
A country seeking to develop economically has to strengthen the workings
of its financial sector. Financial liberalization policies were introduced with
the intent of achieving the desired strengthening; instead these policies led to
financial crises. The banking sector is fundamentally weak at protecting itself
against bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). As financial liberalization
progressed, competition increased; this lowered the strength of banks along
with their franchise value, which made moral hazard in bank management an
all the more serious problem.
Macroeconomic instability becomes the cause for a macro shock which
banks cannot protect themselves against by dispersing their loans over a large
number of borrowers. Therefore it is important to maintain macroeconomic
stability in order to prevent financial crises. But according to the argument of
the trilemma in an open economy, in an environment where international
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capital transactions can be freely conducted, monetary authorities have only
limited ability to stabilize either exchange-rate fluctuations or interest-rate
fluctuations. In effect this means that financial liberalization decreases the
ability of governments to maintain macroeconomic stability.
On the other hand, if a government chooses to regulate the transaction of
international capital, this will put constraints on the procuring of capital
needed for economic development. It will also restrict the competitive envi-
ronment of the financial industry.
When there is a failure to prevent a financial crisis, banks react by reducing
credit (a credit crunch) and companies reduce their borrowing. Both of these
actions become substantial impediments to the stability of the macroeconomy.
In this way policies are interrelated, and because of this, policymakers have
to give due consideration to the way their various policies are combined.
When the Asian currency crisis broke out, the IMF sought to stabilize cur-
rency values through high interest rate policies, which meant abandoning
interest rate stability. This was one of the choices of the trilemma. However,
when demanding the implementation of this policy, the IMF should have
given much more thorough consideration to the adverse impact of high inter-
est rates on the stability of the macroeconomy and on the danger of causing a
financial crisis. Most of the countries hit by the Asian currency crisis suffered
large-scale falls in their rates of economic growth, and the fact that a number
of countries suffered severe financial crises suggests strongly that the high
interest rate policy of the IMF approach put too little value on the interrelating
effects that policies have on one another.
According to the argument of the trilemma, if a government chooses to give
up interest rate stability, it should be able to achieve exchange-rate stability.
However, the IMF’s high interest rate policy was carried out at the same time
that exchange-rate intervention was abandoned with the result that neither
exchange rates nor interest rates could be stabilized. Chapter 2 of this volume
undertook a dynamic analysis using a Dornbusch overshoot model (1976) to
examine the reason for this outcome.
According to the IMF, when the market loses confidence in a country’s
economy, this raises the risk premium on foreign exchange transactions. In
order to stabilize the foreign exchange market, the country will have to raise
interest rates to match the rise in risk premium. Looking at this situation, the
model analysis in Chapter 2 examined the dynamic effects of high interest rate
policy under the assumption that the long-term equilibrium real exchange rate
depreciated. The analysis showed that it was possible to stabilize the ex-
change rate temporarily through high interest rate policy. However, the nomi-
nal exchange rate gradually depreciated until its value reached the level con-
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sistent with the equilibrium real exchange rate. In the Asian currency crisis as
well, even though high interest rate policies were in effect for up to a year,
nominal as well as real exchange rates slowly declined. This situation con-
forms much more to the model analysis in this volume than to the explana-
tions of the IMF.
When the long-term equilibrium exchange rate is depreciating, as dis-
cussed above, and a high interest rate policy has been adopted, this policy can
always be abandoned, and it was shown that the uncertainty caused by this
possibility becomes a factor magnifying risk premium. Thus high interest rate
policy itself can have the ironic effect of creating the very problem it is
attempting to counter.
High interest rate policy also has a bad effect on the financial sector,
especially the profitability of banks, and there is the danger that it can bring on
a financial crisis or worsen an already existing one. In Asian countries bank
financing plays a central role in providing funds to companies, therefore the
adverse impact of high interest rate policy on the banking industry has an
especially severe effect. Chapter 3 compared the bank-based financial system
with its market-based counterpart, undertaking a theoretical analysis of the
factors that form the bank-based financial system in Asian countries (and in
developing countries in general).
When undertaking financial transactions there is usually the problem of an
asymmetry of information. To overcome this problem and have the financial
system develop, there has to be a process where financial institutions them-
selves collect information or where systems and support institutions develop
which can provide information services. In developing countries with their
limited human and economic resources, it is more rational to adopt a bank-
based financial system where the financial institutions themselves have the
incentive to collect information, rather than trying to set up systems and foster
supporting institutions for information gathering which are necessary for
developing financial markets.
Most of the Asian countries have developed bank-based financial systems.
But it seems that this bank-based system was a factor that worsened the bad
effects of the financial crisis. A financial crisis can be expected to have a
negative impact on the balance sheets of banks and other financial interme-
diators, but beyond this such a crisis also hurts the efficiency of financial
operations because it retards the timeliness of fresh information concerning
risk about borrowers which is needed for the efficient functioning of the bank-
based financial system.
The failure to take an overall perspective and synthesize the many policy
issues has not been a fault of the IMF alone. The principal methodology of
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economics and of science in general is to take an object of study and subdivide
it and abstract from it in order to delve more deeply into the observation and
examination of the object. This has been an extremely effective method for
accumulating knowledge. However, this methodology can also constrict per-
spective and cause the failure to synthesize the examined parts into an inter-
connected organic whole.
The chapters in the second half of this volume analyze the problem of
coping with financial crises. Within the sphere of financial theory, the debate
about financial crises has almost entirely dealt with the issue of “how to
prevent a crisis,” while the problem of “how to deal with a crisis once it has
occurred” has received only secondary treatment. It could be that this lopsided
debate is related to the above-mentioned “constricted perspective” that can
afflict economic research. When there is a failure to prevent a financial crisis,
the reluctance of banks to lend and of companies to borrow can upset the
stability of the macroeconomy. Because of the lack of interest in the mutual
relationship between macroeconomic instability and a reluctance to lend and
borrow, the focus of attention has only been on the phenomenon of financial
crises, which has focused debate on the mechanisms that give rise to such
crises and on the related issue of how to prevent such crises.
Besides the small amount of existing research on the problem of coping
with financial crises, another difficulty is the lack of consensus over any good
prescription for overcoming these crises. The discussion in Chapter 4 cen-
tered on the keywords “ex ante” and “ex post” and provided an introduction
for the analyses in Chapters 5 and 6. The chapter also pointed out that worsen-
ing corporate financial conditions caused by a financial crisis distorts corpo-
rate behavior; this distorted behavior brings about reduced corporate investing
which becomes a factor for the instability of the macroeconomy. Chapter 4
also dealt with corporate-debt-restructuring policy as a part of remedial policy
in Asian countries in the aftermath of the currency crisis.
Based on Chapter 4’s introductory discussion, Chapter 5 took up the issue
of government bank-bailout policies. The chapter utilized the concept of time
inconsistency to analyze the problem of moral hazard which can arise from
government efforts to rescue banks. As already pointed out, the debate to date
has been dominated by the argument of how to prevent financial crises, and
this argument has tended to put too much concern on the issue of moral hazard
arising from bank bailout policies. This undue concern has lent support to the
idea that however hard it is on economic stability, the best policy is to let
banks fail today in order to prevent banking crises in the future.
However, as shown in Chapter 5, under certain circumstance bank-bailout
policies can be a rational choice as the best option among second-best choices.
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Such circumstances tend to arise more easily in developing countries; and to
unduly stifle the adoption of bailout policies can only lead to a fall in the level
of social well-being while not necessarily lessening the possibility of banking
crises occurring in the future. Therefore, what is needed first are measures
fostering institutional changes that can bring change to the costs and benefits
of the government’s bailout policy. Only then, does the problem become one
of dealing with the issue of time inconsistency.
Such institutional changes include the structure of the social safety net
needed to cope with a crisis of the financial system. For example, there need to
be measures put in place so that the failure of an individual bank and its
liquidation process do not bring on a crisis for the whole financial system.
Also necessary is maintaining a stable macroeconomic environment by up-
grading the institutions that conduct economic and financial policy and by
pursuing policies that foster development of the financial market.
However, when undertaking bank bailout policies, due care has to be taken
to guard against moral hazard in the banking sector and conflicts of interest
within the concerned administrative offices of the government. These prob-
lems are examined in the latter half of Chapter 5 as they relate to the policies
taken in the different countries following Asia’s currency crisis and to the
institutional arrangements that have come into being with post-crisis financial
restructuring.
Finally Chapter 6 closes this study with a theoretical analysis of the corpo-
rate debt restructuring that has taken place since the Asian currency crisis. The
rise in agency costs as a result of worsening corporate financial conditions has
increased corporate costs for procuring external funds. This has made compa-
nies reluctant to borrow. Usually the restructuring of corporate debt changes
the capital structure of a company, and the way this affects agency costs is one
criterion for evaluating a company’s debt-restructuring program. Debt-equity
conversions are often undertaken, but these are not always the most desirable
method to use. Certainly debt-related agency cost can be reduced through
debt-equity conversions, but this can also raise the agency cost of issuing
stock because of the dilution in the shares held by the controlling stockholders
who own the management rights to the company. In effect, there is no single
approach to corporate debt restructuring. Various methods have to be used
together in skillful combination and in ways that are appropriate for dealing
with the conditions affecting the individual company. But whether individual
companies have debt-restructuring programs or not, institutional reforms that
promote the establishment of a legal system able to deal with bankruptcies
and that encourage better corporate governance have the overall effect of
lowering agency costs.
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The Asian currency crisis that broke out in 1997 was the first such crisis of
the post–Cold War era during which the globalization of economies and
financial markets progressed at a rapid pace. It would be fortunate if such
crises and their ramifications for our globalized markets could be prevented in
the future. But macro shocks still occur, and a financial crisis can break out
with great unexpectedness, as happened in 1997. Globalization means that a
financial crisis in one part of the world can have far-reaching adverse effects;
the crisis that started in Thailand in 1997 ultimately affected countries as far
away as Korea and Brazil. Thus more than just attempting to prevent these
crises, what is needed is focusing attention on coping with currency and
financial crises ex post and developing the tools and methods for overcoming
them after their occurrence. The present volume has been published with this
latter intent in mind and with the hopes of shifting the debate on financial
crises toward these latter objectives.
